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WHEN CRIMINAL ALIENS ARE REPEAT
OFFENDERS FOR PURPOSES OF
DEPORTATION: NGUYEN v. INS,
991 F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1993)
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 19521 authorizes the gov-
ernment to expel criminal aliens2 from the United States.3 In partic-
ular, the Act affirmatively requires the government to deport aliens
convicted of two or more crimes.4 Before deporting repeat criminal
aliens, however, the government must prove that the crimes did not
arise out of a "single scheme" of criminal misconduct.' Courts disa-
gree on what constitutes a single scheme of criminal activity.6 In
1. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1553 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992).
2. The Act defines an alien as "any person not a citizen or national of the United
States." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3).
3. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1260 (outlining procedures and requirements for the de-
portation of aliens).
4. Section 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii) requires the government to deport any alien who
"at any time after entry is convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude, not
arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. . . ." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii).
In addition, the Act requires the government to deport an alien who is "convicted
of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after entry, and...
either is sentenced to confinement or is confined therefor in a prison or correctional
institution for one year or longer." 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(i). This Comment
does not address this provision of the Act.
5. Section 1252(b)(4) saddles the government with the burden of proving that
the crimes did not arise out of a single scheme of criminal activity. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4) (1988). See also Leon-Hernandez v. INS, 926 F.2d 902, 903-04 (9th Cir.
1991) (finding burden to produce clear and convincing evidence on the govern-
ment); accord Nason v. INS, 394 F.2d 223, 226 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830
(1968); Sawkow v. INS, 314 F.2d 34, 37 (3d Cir. 1963); Wood v. Hoy, 266 F.2d 825,
831 (9th Cir. 1954). Section 1252(b)(4) provides that "[n]o decision of deportability
shall be valid unless it is based on reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence."
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4). For a thorough discussion of the government's burden of
proof, see Irving Appleman, "Single Scheme of Criminal Misconduct" in Immigra-
tion Cases, 25 FED. B. J. 396 (1965).
6. See infra notes 29-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the two inter-
pretations. For a recent annotation of court opinions discussing the single scheme
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Nguyen v. INS,7 the Tenth Circuit adopted the "single criminal epi-
sode" test to determine whether two crimes arose out of a single
scheme.8
Nguyen was an adult Vietnamese male who had been admitted
into the United States as a refugee in 1981.9 On August 1, 1988,
Nguyen and a companion were driving a stolen automobile when a
Highway Patrol Officer stopped them for speeding.10 Nguyen shot
at the officer," and was convicted of shooting with intent to kill and
possession of a stolen vehicle. 12 As a result, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) ordered Nguyen to show cause why he
should not be deported. 13 The immigration judge subsequently or-
dered Nguyen deportable pursuant to section 1251(a)(4) for having
committed two crimes of moral turpitude.'4 The Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals (Board) affirmed. 15 On petition for review to the
Tenth Circuit, Nguyen claimed that section 1251(a)(4) did not create
issue, see Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, What Constitutes "Single Scheme of
Criminal Misconduct" for Purposes of § 241(a) (4) of Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 (8 USCS § 1251(a)(4)), Providing for Deportation of Aliens Convicted of
Two Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude, Not Arising Out of Single Scheme of Crimi-
nal Misconduct, 19 A.L.R. FED. 598 (1992).
7. 991 F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1993).
8. Id. at 625.
9. Id. at 622.
10. Id. Nguyen and his companion left from Houston, Texas in the vehicle with
Nguyen's companion driving. Nguyen claimed that when they left Houston he did
not know that the automobile was stolen. He said his companion told him only after
they were out of the Houston area. Approximately seven hours after they left Hous-
ton, an officer stopped them for speeding in Oklahoma. Id.
11. Id. Nguyen's companion did not have a driver's license and the automobile
was not registered in his name. Consequently, the officer put Nguyen's companion
in the patrol car and "ran a check on the vehicle." Nguyen then exited the stolen
auto, approached the patrol car, and shot five times at the officer who was sitting in
the driver's seat. Id.
12. Nguyen, 991 F.2d at 622-23. Nguyen pleaded nolo contendere. The judge
sentenced Nguyen to prison for twenty-three years for shooting with intent to kill
and two years for possession of a stolen vehicle. The sentences were to run consecu-
tively. Id. at 623.
13. Id. The INS issued the order to show cause on April 26, 1991. Id. at 622 n.1.
Thus, the old version of the section (8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1988)) applied in Nguyen
rather than the recodified version (8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. 1992)). The
new version is simply a renumbering of the prior section. See generally infra note 24
for an explanation of the inapplicability of the renumbered section.




cause for his deportation.16 He argued that the August 1, 1988
crimes of shooting with intent to kill and possession of a stolen vehi-
cle arose out of a "single scheme of criminal misconduct."' 7 The
Tenth Circuit disagreed with Nguyen and affirmed the Board's deci-
sion that he was deportable. 8
The United States government has inherent power to expel
aliens.19 The government can deport aliens for any reason Congress
16. Id. Nguyen made two other claims, both of which the court denied. First,
Nguyen argued that the Board erred in denying his application for granting asylum
and withholding deportation. A deportable alien is eligible for asylum if proved to
be a refugee due to persecution or a "well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988). Nguyen asked for asylum based on his claim
that the Vietnamese had mistreated his father and brothers in the past and would
punish him for desertion of his military post. Nguyen, 991 F.2d at 625. The court
found these claims unsubstantiated and held that the petitioner failed to meet his
burden of proof on the issue. Id. at 625-26.
Second, Nguyen contended that the Board erred in retroactively applying a
mandatory deportation regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(1). Nguyen, 991 F.2d at 626.
Section 208.14(c)(1) requires mandatory denial of asylum applications on or after
October 1, 1990 in cases of serious crimes. Despite the serious nature of the shoot-
ing, the Tenth Circuit agreed that the statute did not apply in this case because the
application was filed before October 1, 1990. Id. at 626. Nevertheless, the court
determined that the lower court had actually applied 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B)
(1988), which was applicable to Nguyen. Under the Code, an alien can be deported,
despite threats to the alien's "life or freedom" upon return to his native country, if
"the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime,
constitutes a danger to the community of the United States." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(h)(2)(B). The Tenth Circuit held that under this test, the lower court prop-
erly exercised its discretion in finding the petitioner's crimes adequately serious.
Nguyen, 991 F.2d at 626.
17. Nguyen, 991 F.2d at 623.
18. Id. at 625. See infra notes 72-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the court's reasoning in the Nguyen decision.
19. Congress's power to create laws regarding deportation is derived from the
sovereign authority of the United States as a nation and the Commerce Clause of
the U.S. Constitution. See H.R. REP,. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 6 (1952),
reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1654 (explaining that "the right to exclude or
expel all aliens ... is an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and in-
dependent nation"); WALTER M. BESTERmAN, UNrrED STATES HousE OF REPRE-
SENTATIVES, COMMENTARY ON THE ImMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY AcT 60, in 8
U.S.C.A., pt. 1 (1953); see also The Chinese Exclusion Case, Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (explaining that Congress has unquestionable
authority to exclude aliens from the United States under the Commerce Clause).
The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power "[tlo regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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deems necessary to protect the best interests of the United States.20
In 1952, Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act21
which includes regulations governing deportation.22 In particular,
Congress drafted section 1251 of the Act with the intent to expand
the grounds for deportation, specifically, the deportation of criminal
aliens.3 Section 1251 provides that "any alien shall, upon order of
the Attorney General, be deported... who at any time after entry is
convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of
a single scheme of criminal misconduct."' 4 Congress did not pro-
20. H.R. Ra-P. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952), reprinted in 1952
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1654 (explaining that the right to expel aliens is "essential to
[this country's] ... safety.., independence, and ... welfare...").
21. Congress overrode President Truman's veto and the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act became law on June 27, 1952. BsTERmAN, supra note 19, at 4. The
purpose of the Act was to provide a "comprehensive, revised immigration, naturali-
zation, and nationality code." H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952),
reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653. This was the first time the United States had
one comprehensive statute governing immigration, naturalization, and nationality.
BESTERMAN, supra note 19, at 2.
22. In the legislative history of the Act, Congress emphasized its absolute au-
thority to set the conditions under which aliens may enter and remain in the United
States. Congress emphasized its right to exclude or expel any alien "for any reason,
whatsoever." H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952), reprinted in 1952
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653.
23. Senator McCarran, a co-sponsor of the bill, explained that the Act was
"designed to strengthen the exclusion and deportation procedures so that we can
prevent the entry and cause the deportation of subversives, criminals and un-
desirables." 98 CONG. Rac. 8254 (1952). See also Pacheco v. INS, 546 F.2d 448, 449
n.3 (1st Cir. 1976) (observing that § 1251(a)(4) was less gentle and more restrictive
than previous deportation provisions), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 985 (1977); Costello v.
INS, 311 F.2d 343, 344 (2d Cir. 1962) (noting that one of the specific objectives of
the Immigration and Nationality Act was to "broaden the provisions governing de-
portation. .."); BERmAN, supra note 19, at 61 (commenting that the Immigration
and Nationality Act broadened the provisions concerning criminal and subversive
aliens).
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1988) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii)
(Supp. IV 1992)). The Immigration Act of 1990 renumbered this section as 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii). The new text of § 1251 is broken down into several additional
categories. With respect to multiple criminal convictions, the text is nearly identical
and substantively the same. Section 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii) provides that "[a]ny alien
who at any time after entry is convicted of two or more crimes involving moral
turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, regardless of
whether confined therefor and regardless of whether the convictions were in a single
trial, is deportable." 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii).
The new section governs only orders to show cause issued after March 1, 1991.
See Nguyen, 991 F.2d at 622 n.1. Since § 1251(a)(4) applied to the case at hand, this
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vide any guidance in either the Act' or the legislative history26 for
the proper interpretation of the phrase "single scheme."'27 Courts
have developed two different tests to determine whether multiple
acts of misconduct are part of a single scheme: the "single criminal
episode" test and the "common plan" test.'
The Board was the first appellate forum to grapple with section
1251(a)(4), and in doing so laid the foundation for the single crimi-
nal episode test.29 In In re Z,30 the Board adopted a "natural and
reasonable" interpretation of "single scheme of criminal miscon-
duct."'" If an alien commits an act "which, in and of itself, consti-
tutes a complete, individual and distinct crime," then commission of
comment will refer to the old section number. See id. (noting that the show cause
order in this case was issued in 1990).
25. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii)
(Supp. IV 1992)) (providing no explanation of term "single scheme").
26. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), reprinted in
1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653.
27. Courts often emphasize this omission in their analysis. See, e.g., Nguyen v.
INS, 991 F.2d 621, 623 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that legislative history did not reveal
any congressional intent on the definition of "single scheme"); Iredia v. INS, 981
F.2d 847, 849 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that "there is no clear congressional intent in
the definition of a 'single scheme"'); Pacheco v. INS, 546 F.2d 448, 449 (1st Cir.
1976) (stating that legislative history "shed no light on § 1251(a)(4)"); Wood v. Hoy,
266 F.2d 825, 828-29 (9th Cir. 1959) (stating that "[t]he Act does not define ...
'single scheme' of criminal conduct, [n]or does the legislative history shed any light"
on the intent of Congress).
The absence of legislative history regarding this phrase is significant because of
the Supreme Court's holding in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), which addressed the appropriate standard of review
for an agency's construction of a statute that it administers. In Chevron, the
Supreme Court held that if a statute "is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute." Id. at 843.
28. See infra notes 29-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the single
criminal episode test. See infra notes 53-70 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the common plan test.
29. See generally Appleman, supra note 5, at 397-99 for a detailed discussion of
Board opinions on § 1251(a)(4).
30. 6 I. & N. Dec. 167 (1954).
31. Id. at 168-69. In In re Z, the respondent forged the name and cashed the
checks of the same individual on two separate occasions. Id. at 168. The Board
refused to find a single episode of misconduct. The Board reasoned that "the fact
that the acts may be similar in character, that the same person is the victim in each
instance, or that each distinct and separate crime is part of an overall plan of crimi-
nal misconduct is immaterial." Id. at 169.
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another crime is cause for deportation.32 The Board refused to con-
sider similarities in nature, circumstances, or common plan of the
crimes.33
In In re Z, the Board in dictum provided two examples of acts
that would constitute a single scheme of criminal misconduct.34 In
the first example, convictions for possessing and passing a fake note
would constitute a single scheme because possession is a necessary
condition of passing the note.35 In the second example, convictions
for burglary and assault of a homeowner would arise out of a single
scheme because the assault flows naturally from the burglary.36 The
Board noted, however, that if the burglar in the second example
robbed the house next door, the criminal conduct would not arise
out of a single scheme.37 The Board clarified this caveat in In re j,38
which held that a criminal who is free to discontinue criminal activ-
ity at any time cannot successfully plead a single scheme.39
32. Id. at 168-69. The Board addressed § 1251(a)(4) for the first time in In re A,
5 I. & N. Dec. 470 (1953). In In re A, the respondent was convicted of three sepa-
rate robberies, with three different victims, at three different times. Rather than
interpret "arising out of a single scheme of criminal conduct," the Board decided
simply that they were "certain" that the alien's acts were not a part of a single
scheme of conduct, and thus did not provide an analysis of the statute. Id. at 470-71.
The Board denied the request for abeyance of deportation. Id. at 471.




37. Id. See also In re B, 8 I. & N. Dec. 236 (1958), in which the Board consid-
ered an interpretation of single scheme which extended only to acts affecting one
person, such as counterfeiting. The Board rejected this view as too narrow. Instead,
the Board opted for its current position which allows one criminal episode, such as
assault and burglary of a store owner. Id. at 238.
38. 6 L & N. Dec. 382 (1954).
39. Id. at 385-86. In In re J, the respondent pleaded guilty to two counts of
income tax evasion occurring in 1947 and 1948. Id. at 382. The Board refused to
find a single scheme, and held that "respondent was under no compulsion to act as
he did and was free to cease his purposeful acts of attempted tax evasion at any
time." Id. at 386. Cf. Costello v. INS, 311 F.2d 343, 348 (2d Cir. 1962) (holding that
no connection existed between convictions for tax evasion in 1948 and 1949 because
of the substantial time separation). But cf. Barrese v. Ryan, 203 F. Supp. 880, 882-83
(D. Conn. 1962) (finding a single scheme when plaintiff failed to pay a federal occu-
pational tax in 1951 and 1952).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol45/iss1/10
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The Board's standard has become known as the single criminal
episode test.4° In a recent Board decision, In re Adetiba,41 peti-
tioner was convicted on fifteen counts of misrepresentation and
fraud, and claimed that these acts stemmed from a common plan.42
The Board rejected petitioner's argument, holding that elaborate
plans and similar modus operandi do not establish a "single scheme
of criminal misconduct."43 The language "single scheme," the
Board explained, is a statutory exception referring to acts in which
one crime is a lesser included offense or naturally flows from an-
other crime in furtherance of a single criminal episode.'
In Pacheco v. INS,4 5 the First Circuit adopted the Board's posi-
tion and held that single scheme implies a single transaction without
interruption or opportunity to dissociate from the criminal acts.46
The First Circuit concluded that the exception's purpose was to give
one-time alien offenders a second chance.47 The court warned
against broad interpretations of single scheme48 because broad,
40. See In re B, 8 I. & N. Dec. 236, 238 (1958) (explaining that single scheme
means "essentially one act" and does not include continuing criminal misconduct);
In re M, 7 I. & N. Dec. 144 (1956) ("The fact that one [crime] may follow the other
closely, even immediately, in point of time is of no moment."); In re P, 6 I. & N.
Dec. 795, 799 (1955) (finding that repetition of similar crimes does not constitute a
single scheme); In re D, 5 I. & N. 728, 729-30 (1954) (finding evidence of planning
and similarities of timing and character inconsequential).
41. Interim Dec. No. 3177 (BIA May 22, 1992).
42. Id. at 3, 5.
43. Id. at 8. See also Fitzgerald ex. reL Miceli v. Landon, 238 F.2d 864, 865, 867
(1st Cir. 1956) (holding proof of a single scheme requires evidence of a "single crimi-
nal enterprise" and evidence of a similar modus operandi is not enough).
44. In re Adetiba, Interim Dec. No. 3177, at 6.
45. 546 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985 (1977).
46. Id. at 451.
47. Id. (citing Nason v. INS, 394 F.2d 223, 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
830 (1968)).
48. Id. at 450. Notwithstanding the "tempt[ation] to soften the harshness of the
requirement by treating 'single scheme' as an elastic concept," the Pacheco court
refused to condone broad interpretations of § 1251(a)(4). Id. For examples of cases
in which harsh orders resulted, see, e.g., In re Z, 6 1. & N. Dec. 167 (1954) (deporting
a twenty-seven year old, who was the wife of a native-born U.S. citizen and the
mother of two native-born American children and expecting a third, for two counts
of cashing forged checks); In re J, 6 I. & N. Dec. 382 (1954) (deporting a forty-four
year old, who had resided in the United States since he was eight, for two counts of
income tax evasion).
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multi-factor tests often lead to bizarre, inequitable results that are
contrary to congressional intent.49
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the First Circuit in Iredia v. INS."
The Iredia court explained that a focus on criminal planning can
lead to theoretical absurdities." For example, under the common
plan test, an alien thief convicted of ten burglaries could not be de-
ported pursuant to section 1251(a)(4) if he could prove a common
plan and could show that he acted according to that plan. 2
Despite criticisms such as the Fifth Circuit's in Iredia, some courts
advocate the common plan test.53 The Ninth Circuit, in Wood v.
Hoy,5 4 held that the common plan test is the appropriate plain lan-
guage interpretation of single scheme.55  The Wood court com-
plained that the Board incorrectly read section 1251(a)(4) as if
Congress had written "single act."56 In direct contrast to the Board,
49. Pacheco, 546 F.2d at 451. The court noted that a common plan test would
doom a criminal "whose crimes were committed during periods of intoxication, but
save[ ] from deportation one who coolly mapped out several robberies in advance."
Id. See infra notes 53-70 and accompanying text for an explanation of the common
plan test.
50. 981 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, No. 93-5043, 1993 WL 247918 (Oct. 4,
1993).
51. Id. at 849 (quoting Gonzalez-Sandoval v. INS, 910 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1990)
(providing definition of word "scheme")). See also Chanan Din Khan v. Barber, 253
F.2d 547, 550 (9th Cir.) (asserting theory that if income tax evasion in successive
years was considered a single scheme, then convictions 20 years apart would be
also), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 920 (1958).
52. Iredia, 981 F.2d at 849.
53. See infra notes 54-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of courts that
apply the common plan test. See also Nason v. INS, 394 F.2d 223, 227 (2d Cir.)
(holding that section 1251(a)(4) is broader than a single criminal act or transaction,
but narrower than a "vague, indeterminate expectation to repeat a prior criminal
modus operandi"), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968); Barrese v. Ryan, 203 F. Supp.
880, 886-87 (D. Conn. 1962) (rejecting expressly a "single criminal episode" test);
Zito v. Moutal, 174 F. Supp. 531, 537 (N.D. Ili. 1959) (rejecting the Board's reading
of § 1251(a)(4) in favor of the interpretation in Jeronimo); Jeronimo v. Murff, 157 F.
Supp. 808, 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (commenting that probative factors include the ini-
tial planned purpose, circumstances, timing, and modus operandi of the crimes).
54. 266 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1959).
55. Id. at 830. The Wood court, citing Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6
(1948), noted that statutory ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the alien. 266
F.2d at 830. The Supreme Court in Fong Haw Tan said "[w]e resolve the doubts in
favor of that construction because deportation is a drastic measure and at times the
equivalent of banishment or exile." Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S at 8.
56. Wood, 266 F.2d at 830. The Wood court provided no rationale for its intui-
tive interpretation except that "we must take the language as we find it." Id. See
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the Ninth Circuit found the pivotal criteria to be the nature, time,
and circumstances of the crimes.57 Thus, the Ninth Circuit reversed
the lower court's finding of no single scheme because both crimes
were first degree robberies, were committed within three days of
each other, involved the same four people, and followed similar mo-
dus operandi.58
The Third Circuit followed the lead of the Ninth Circuit in
Sawkow v. INS.5 9 Sawkow, the petitioner, was convicted of receiv-
ing a stolen vehicle and stealing another the next day.60 Noting the
similar nature and the time frame of the crimes, the Third Circuit
reversed a finding that there was not a single scheme.6'
In two recent decisions, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed Wood v.
Hoy and its reliance on the common plan interpretation. In Gonza-
lez-Sandoval v. INS,6" petitioner robbed the same bank twice in two
days.63 The Ninth Circuit reversed a lower court order for deporta-
tion on the grounds that the lower court had not applied the Wood
v. Hoy test for single scheme.6'
also Barrese v. Ryan, 203 F. Supp. 880,886-87 (D. Conn. 1962) (criticizing the Board
for adhering to an incorrect interpretation of "single scheme"); Zito v. Moutal, 174
F. Supp. 531, 537 (N.D. 111. 1959) (noting that the statute does not include the word
"episode"); Jeronimo v. Murff, 157 F. Supp. 808, 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (emphasizing
that the statute reads "single scheme," not "single transaction"). But see Pacheco v.
INS, 546 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1976) (noting that the adjective "single" denotes a
"temporally integrated episode of continuous activity").
57. Wood, 266 F.2d at 831. For cases employing similar rationale, see
LeTourneur v. INS, 538 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1976); Nason v. INS, 394 F.2d 223 (2d
Cir. 1968); Jeronimo v. Murft, 157 F. Supp. 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
58. Wood, 266 F.2d at 832. The court remanded the case to the district court for
determination according to the court's interpretation of single scheme. Id.
59. 314 F.2d 34 (3d Cir. 1963).
60. Id. at 38.
61. The court did not hold that a single scheme existed. Rather, the court found
that the government had not met its burden of proof. Noting contrary evidence, the
court reasoned that "[t]he test of substantial evidence is not met by evidence which
gives equal support to inconsistent inferences." Id. See generally supra note 5 for a
discussion about the burden of proof in deportation proceedings.
62. 910 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1990).
63. Id. at 615. Gonzalez-Sandoval wanted to steal over $10,000, but each teller
could access only $1,000 at a time. Therefore, Gonzalez-Sandoval decided on sev-
eral heists. Gonzalez-Sandoval completed his second attempt and would have at-
tempted a third robbery on the third day but a large crowd in the bank that
appeared to be undercover police scared him away. Id.
64. Id. at 618.
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In the second recent Ninth Circuit case, Leon-Hernandez v.
INS, 65 petitioner pleaded guilty to two counts of oral copulation
with a minor.66 The acts occurred one month apart and involved the
same victim.67 Petitioner could offer only proof of a sketchy plan.6"
He argued that planning, particularly with regard to ongoing crimi-
nal activity, was only one factor in determining whether a single
scheme existed.69 The Leon-Hernandez court rejected this argu-
ment and refused to find a single scheme absent evidence of a spe-
cific criminal plan.70
In Nguyen v. INS,71 the Tenth Circuit followed the Board and the
First and Fifth Circuits and adopted the single criminal episode in-
terpretation of section 1251(a)(4).7' The Nguyen court found that,
absent clear congressional intent of the meaning of single scheme,
the Board's interpretation was reasonable.73 The court agreed with
two aspects of the Board's reasoning.74 First, to constitute a single
scheme, crimes should be part of a natural flow of events.75 Second,
crimes are separate acts if the criminal is free at any time to cease
activity.76 The Nguyen court also agreed that a common plan test
leads to absurd results.7 7 Thus, the Tenth Circuit adopted the single
65. 926 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1991).
66. Id. at 903.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 905. Petitioner argued that he believed the victim was his girlfriend.
Id.
69. Id.
70. Leon-Hernandez, 926 F.2d at 905 (citing Nason v. INS, 394 F.2d 223,227 (2d
Cir.) (declining to find a single scheme when the evidence showed only a "nebulous
intention to repeat [a] crime with the same or other victims some day in the indefi-
nite future"), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968)).
71. 991 F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1993).
72. Id. at 623.
73. The Tenth Circuit deferred to the Board pursuant to Chevron, discussed
supra note 27. Nguyen, 991 F.2d at 623 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)). See also Iredia v. INS, 981
F.2d 847, 849 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the Board's interpretation of "single
scheme" was reasonable according to Chevron). But cf. Leon-Hernandez v. INS, 926
F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1991) (neglecting to note Chevron before declining to follow the
Board's interpretation); Gonzalez-Sandoval v. INS, 910 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1990)
(making no reference to Chevron when rejecting the Board's interpretation).
74. Nguyen, 991 F.2d at 624-25.
75. Id. at 624 (citing In re Z, 6 I. & N. Dec. 167, 168-69 (1954)).
76. Id. (citing In re J, 6 I. & N. Dec. 382, 385-86 (1954)).
77. Id. (citing In re Adetiba, Interim Dec. No. 3177, at 12 (BIA May 22, 1992)).
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criminal episode test articulated by the Board and the Fifth and First
Circuits.78
Applying the single criminal episode test to the facts of this case,
the Nguyen court held that Nguyen was deportable because the
crimes he committed were not part of a single criminal episode, and
thus not part of a single scheme.79 Nguyen did not need to shoot at
the police officer to succeed in stealing the car.80 The theft was
completed before the officer stopped Nguyen's companion for
speeding.8 ' At the time of the shooting, Nguyen was already en-
joying the fruits of the theft.'
The Tenth Circuit in Nguyen properly adopted the single criminal
episode test because that standard advances general congressional
intent to expand the government's authority to deport criminal
aliens and encourages even-handed application of the law.83 A
plain language interpretation of section 1251(a)(4) is problematic
because the language gives rise to multiple reasonable interpreta-
tions.84 The legislative history of section 1251 provides no help in
choosing an interpretation of the section because Congress did not
78. Id. at 625.
79. Nguyen, 991 F.2d at 625. The Nguyen court might not have found a single
scheme, even if applying a common plan test. Nguyen would have had to present
evidence that he planned to shoot if pulled over. Moreover, the court would have
likely required additional proof of the similar nature and circumstances of the shoot-
ing and theft of the car. See id. at 622. See generally supra text accompanying notes
53-70 for a discussion of the common plan test.
80. Nguyen, 991 F.2d at 625.
81. l See supra text accompanying notes 34-37 for two hypotheticals which
highlight the difference between completed acts and those which arise out of a single
criminal episode.
82. Nguyen, 991 F.2d at 625.
83. When interpreting § 1251(a)(4) (current version at § 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii)),
courts are split over whether the Board or the alien should receive the benefit of the
doubt. The disparity stems from tension between competing policies: granting def-
erence to the Board and resolving statutory ambiguities in favor of the alien. Com-
pare supra note 27 with supra note 55 for discussions of the conflicting approaches
to this dilemma. The conflict is relevant to a proper interpretation of § 1251(a)(4),
but is beyond the scope of this comment. See supra note 23 for a brief discussion of
congressional intent regarding the Immigration and Nationality Act.
84. Those courts using the single criminal episode test and those using the com-
mon plan test both made legitimate claims to a natural translation of § 1251(a)(4)
(current version at § 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii)). For a discussion of both interpretations,
compare supra note 31 and accompanying text with supra notes 55-56 and accompa-
nying text.
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explain the single scheme exception.85 Thus, for guidance, courts
should look to congressional intent with respect to deportation pro-
visions of the Act in general.8 6 Courts also should consider practical
concerns surrounding the application of their interpretation of sin-
gle scheme. 7
The common plan test broadens the single scheme exception to
block the deportation of calculated professional criminals; a result
which contravenes general congressional intent.88 When drafting
section 1251, Congress intended to increase the grounds for depor-
tation.89 Under the common plan test, repeat criminal aliens can
escape deportation by plotting and executing careful plans.90 More-
over, the common plan test is difficult to apply because it centers on
an individual's preparation, which encourages fabrication and out-
right lies.91 Courts using the common plan test advocate the use of
objective criteria such as the nature, time, and circumstances of the
85. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the absence
of any legislative commentary on single scheme.
86. See supra note 23 and accompanying text for a discussion of congressional
intent regarding deportation in the Act.
87. See infra notes 88-94 and 95-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of
pros and cons in applying the two tests.
88. See supra note 23 and accompanying text for an explanation of congressional
intent with respect to § 1251(a)(4).
89. See supra notes 2-5, 24-27 and accompanying text for general and back-
ground information on § 1251(a)(4) (current version at § 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii)).
90. Courts have commented that this type of result is "absurd." See Iredia v.
INS, 981 F.2d 847, 849 (5th Cir. 1993); Chanan Din Khan v. Barber, 253 F.2d 547,
550 (9th Cir. 1958); In re Adetiba, Interim Dec. No. 3177, at 8 (BIA, May 22, 1992).
See supra note 53 for examples of cases where courts using a common plan test
overturned deportation of calculated professional criminals.
91. See generally Appleman, supra note 5, at 405-06 (arguing that an alien has
motivation to testify about a preconceived plan because the alien has already been
convicted, and hence faces no risk by presenting such statements). When courts
apply a common plan test, aliens convicted of two or more crimes must link the
criminal activities through evidence of pre-planning. Since the criminal is the best
and sometimes the only source of evidence of pre-planning, the court must rely on
the criminal's imagination. Unwittingly, courts may encourage fabrication. In
Leon-Hernandez v. INS, for example, the Ninth Circuit rejected Leon-Hernandez'
sole defense that the victim was his girlfriend and ruled that "an alien must do more
than simply present 'any evidence' of a common scheme." 926 F.2d at 904-05. Had
Leon-Fernandez had the foresight of the court's opinion, he may have
"remembered" specific plans, times, and circumstances.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol45/iss1/10
CRIMINAL ALIENS
crimes.92 However, such criteria are actually highly subjective93 and
lead to theoretical absurdities.94
The single criminal episode test narrows the single scheme excep-
tion to include only one-time criminal offenders, which furthers con-
gressional intent to increase deportation of criminal aliens.95 In
addition, the single criminal episode test objectively focuses on the
criminal act96 rather than the individual's subjective thoughts. 7
Courts applying the single criminal episode test do not consider the
nature, time, or circumstances of the crimes, except the condition
that one crime must necessitate the commission of the other.98
92. See supra note 57 and accompanying text for an example of a court advocat-
ing such criteria.
93. See, e.g., Pacheco v. INS, 546 F.2d 448, 451 (1st Cir. 1976) (commenting that
use of a multi-factored test results in "selective law enforcement and disparities in
judicial treatment").
94. Despite advocating the use of nature, time, and circumstance criteria in Gon-
zalez-Sandoval and Leon-Hernandez, the Ninth Circuit had previously admitted
that use of such criteria can lead to absurdities. See Chanan Din Khan v. Barber,
253 F.2d 547, 550 (9th Cir. 1958) (finding absurd the possibility that crimes, sepa-
rated by years, would be of a single scheme because similar in plan). See also Iredia
v. INS, 981 F.2d 847, 849 (5th Cir. 1993) (commenting that a planning approach to
single scheme accommodates theoretical absurdities); In re Adetiba, Interim Dec.
No. 3177, at 8 (BIA, May 22, 1992) (protesting that an emphasis on the planning
stage renders § 1251(a)(4) impotent in the case of thoughtful criminals).
95. See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text for discussion of congressional
intent with regard to deportation.
Despite its advantages in some instances, the single criminal episode test may frus-
trate congressional intent to deport professional criminal aliens. For example, a
criminal who planned and executed a bank robbery knowing that the murder of
three guards and the theft of a car were necessary to the success of the heist may
escape deportation. This result is possible because courts using a single criminal
episode test hinge "single scheme" on the necessity and the natural flow of criminal
acts.
96. See Pacheco v. INS, 546 F.2d 448 (lst Cir. 1976) (involving a single transac-
tion with no time to disassociate from the criminal acts), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985
(1977); In re Adetiba, Interim Dec. No. 3177, at 6 (BIA, May 22, 1992) (noting that
crime was a natural consequence); In re J, 6 I. & N. Dec. 382,386 (1954) (stating that
a single share of criminal misconduct is present if several criminal offenses are com-
mitted during the performance of one unified act of criminal misconduct).
97. See In re Z, 6 I. & N. Dec. 167, 169 (1954) (holding that an overall plan of
criminal misconduct is immaterial).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
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In Nguyen, the Tenth Circuit joined ranks with those courts advo-
cating a single criminal episode interpretation of the single scheme99
language in section 1251(a)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act. The Nguyen decision properly prevents the single scheme ex-
ception from swallowing the rule requiring deportation of repeat
criminal aliens.
Thomas J. Egan*
99. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of courts ap-
plying the single criminal episode test.
* J.D./M.B.A. 1995, Washington University.
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